Abstract A National Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL) assists a State to assess whether nuclear material encountered out of regulatory control is of domestic or international origin. By leveraging nuclear material registries, nuclear enterprise records, and safeguards accountancy information, as well as existing domestic technical capability and subject-matter domain expertise, states can better assess the effort required for setting up an NNFL. States who are largely recipients of nuclear and radiological materials and have no internal production capabilities may create an NNFL that relies on existing information rather than carry out advanced analyses on domestic materials.
Introduction
A National Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL) enhances a state's ability to identify nuclear and other radioactive material used, produced, or stored within their country, and promotes good practices for maintaining material under regulatory control. When nuclear material is encountered out of regulatory control, an NNFL assists a State to assess whether the material is of domestic or international origin.
An NNFL administratively organizes information on domestic nuclear activities and materials into a single database or a federation of databases, allowing investigators to compare characteristics of interdicted nuclear material with domestic holdings. The development of an NNFL begins with identifying, organizing, and populating existing domestic nuclear fuel cycle information into a single database or federation of databases. Much of this information already exists within a state's nuclear material registry, enterprise records, or safeguards (accountancy) records, having been collected previously. Given that much of this information was collected for non-nuclear forensics purposes, it is important that data fidelity issues be taken into account. That is to say, that this information may not be of high enough fidelity to definitely rule in or out the origins of interdicted nuclear or radiological materials. NNFLs should also be supported by a robust laboratory capability to generate data through nuclear forensic analysis of materials, as well as subject-matter domain experts who can determine which material characteristics are relevant for nuclear forensics purposes and should be included in an NNFL. By identifying the nuclear material process This assessment will raise awareness, encourage political buy-in, and be an important first step in helping states have a better understanding of the potential effort standing up an NNFL may take. Additionally, it allows states to formulate a basis for assessing the availability of existing information within its borders, as well as what technical capability and subject-matter domain expertise it possesses and may require. This approach for evaluating NNFL effort, based on the sophistication of nuclear and other radiological material produced and used in a state, will also help inform the basis for international consultations and the development of guidance for facilitating practical implementation of NNFLs globally.
An NNFL enables states to make rapid comparisons of interdicted nuclear material with domestic holdings and excludes domestic materials that are inconsistent with measurements derived from (nuclear forensic) analysis. Without a comprehensive database listing the properties of legitimately owned and controlled nuclear and radiological materials, and a basis for interpreting those properties, investigators are faced with sorting through potentially tens of thousands of records in trying to determine whether the interdicted material in question is of domestic origin. Without an NNFL, investigators have little basis to determine the possible origin of the interdicted material. In the context of investigating a nuclear security event, the ability to include or exclude likely origins of material provides a state with the information it needs to determine whether there are gaps within its operational nuclear security system.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) have developed guidance on organizing information on nuclear materials based on the nuclear fuel cycle stages, a context for material comparisons, and guidance on graded NNFL complexity based on domestic nuclear fuel cycle sophistication, but have not developed guidance on how much effort and resources a state may have to expend to construct an NNFL [1, 2] .
Methodology
Literature on NNFLs suggests that existing information and capabilities may be sufficient for a state to establish and maintain an effective NNFL capability. Identifying this type of information is the first step in establishing an NNFL and as such requires further examination. This paper will answer the question of how much effort it may take to establish an NNFL through the lens of utilizing existing information and capabilities needed to develop as well as maintain an NNFL. This approach is not aimed at creating a final model for NNFLs; rather it is intended to stimulate further dialogue as to what states should consider before beginning to establish an NNFL, what role existing information, technical capability, and subject-matter domain expertise play in an NNFL, and how much effort will ultimately be involved in developing NNFLs. Once governments have established their own NNFLs, they are encouraged to share their experiences and develop best practices with the goal of articulated guidelines that subsequent states may follow. In helping states determine the level of effort, it is important for states to take stock of their domestic nuclear fuel cycle, identify sources of existing information, identify subject-matter domain experts, and determine the state's technical capability to conduct nuclear forensic analysis. In order to determine the availability of existing administrative and analytical information, technical capability, and subject-matter domain expertise within various types of states, states are placed into groups based on ITWG guidance. This guidance was determined by assessing nuclear fuel cycle sophistication beginning with nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radiological sources, and culminating in states with nuclear weapons ( The constituent elements of this approach are described in greater detail below. It is important to note that the activities listed under each grouping are not all encompassing, i.e., Group 4 does not need to include all of the elements considered in Groups 1-3. Furthermore, in addition to examining the present day nuclear fuel cycle and associated nuclear materials within the state, it is important to consider the nuclear fuel cycle activities within the state a whole, including historical and legacy nuclear fuel cycle activities and associated materials.
Nuclear weapon states and states with sophisticated commercial nuclear enterprises (states falling within groupings 2, 3, and 4) have a much larger pool of information to identify and organize, and thus are faced with the most daunting tasks setting up an NNFL. These types of states should give consideration to creating a detailed NNFL capturing many fields, as well as carrying out additional analysis on nuclear and radioactive materials where available information is of lower-fidelity. While these states have the most daunting task in setting up an NNFL, they are also the states with a sophisticated technical and subject-matter domain expert base to carry out analyses on any nuclear or radiological materials residing in their borders. States falling within groupings 2, 3, and 4 combined, a sum of 36 states or roughly 22 %, are in the minority of the IAEA Member States total.
States who are largely recipients of nuclear and radiological materials and have no internal production capabilities, states falling within Group 1, are faced with a greatly simplified task in setting up an NNFL and may consider creating an NNFL that relies on, but may not have the technical or financial resources to carry out, advanced analyses on domestic materials. The type of NNFL that these states may wish to construct could simply list inventories of nuclear and radiological materials and specifications that are available from information collected for operational, regulatory, and safeguards requirements. If these types of states wish to supplement this type of data with more detailed information on the nuclear or radiological materials within their borders, they can either carry out the analyses or request more detailed characteristics be supplied by the producing state. In addition, states who are trans-shippers of nuclear and radiological materials, and are temporary repositories for such materials, may consider including in their NNFL a database that covers inventory of materials that are in transit. States falling within Group 1, a sum 128 states or roughly 78 %, are in the majority of the IAEA Member States total.
Group 1 states make up the majority of the IAEA Member States, so it was decided to use these states as a basis for further examination. Over 75 % of the total IAEA Member States can determine a baseline for assessing their domestic nuclear material holdings, technical capabilities, and ultimately identify gaps. Group 1 states can be further sub-divided into two smaller groupings, each with their own unique technical capability and subject-mater domain expertise. Of the total 128 IAEA Member States falling under Group 1, thirty-two (roughly 25 %) are states with nuclear power plants and/or research reactors; ninety-six states (i.e., 75 %) only possess radiological sources. The purpose for this further sub-division is to differentiate the type of technical capability each unique sub-grouping may possess (Table 2) . States with nuclear power plants and/or research reactors, especially those with research reactors, will frequently have associated technical and subject-matter domain expert base to carry out characteristic analysis on the nuclear or radiological materials within their borders if required. States with only radiological sources will frequently not have technical and subject-matter domain expert base to carry our analysis on the radiological sources within their borders.
In accordance with national regulatory and safeguards reporting requirements, users and trans-shippers of nuclear or radiological material routinely collect and report information on nuclear fuel cycle operations. In order to meet these requirements, these actors routinely catalogue information on the materials in their possession and frequently also possess the technical capability to conduct analysis on the nuclear or radiological materials they are producing or utilizing. For example, when a nuclear fuel shipment arrives at a nuclear power plant, the fuel in question arrives with documentation certifying that the fuel meets the specifications for the reactor(s). Additionally, as the fuel moves through the reactor and is deposited in a spent-fuel pool, the operator will possess information on that spentfuel, such as fuel burn-up and percentage of plutonium, in order to demonstrate to the IAEA that no fuel has been diverted. Although originally collected for safeguards and regulatory reporting requirements, this type of information could be useful in a nuclear security investigation. If existing nuclear material information is deemed insufficient for nuclear forensics purposes, a state could request additional information from international producers, or if the technical capability exists within the state a domestic scientific center to carry out initial analyses on the nuclear or radioactive materials in question and then utilize the new information to populate their NNFL's respective database(s). Much the data a state would want to populate an NNFL with may already exist within a state and the state should make every effort to locate and organize these data. Within the bounds of commercial sensitivities and a proper legal framework, states should identify, evaluate, and organize the data for inclusion into an NNFL. Sources for information include: information from safeguards accountancy records, nuclear regulatory agencies, nuclear enterprises, radiation protection agencies, and nuclear research centers.
It is important to note that while this information is extremely valuable for protecting inventories of sensitive materials, it generally may not be of high enough fidelity to help identify whether or not nuclear or radiological material found outside of regulatory control is consistent with those inventories. However, information collected for non-nuclear forensics purposes is useful for identifying the materials that should be represented in an NNFL, and serves as a starting point for determining the characteristics of those materials necessary to identify consistency with domestic inventories, and could potentially provide unique data of highly discriminatory value if combined with 'tradition forensic' information.
All nuclear materials residing in a state should be included in an NNFL. The list includes all domestically, held, produced, and transshipped sources. The United States ''Material Characteristics Data Dictionary for Forensic Applications,'' or simply Data Dictionary, has suggested over 250 parameters falling within eight sections (one section for Metadata to describe the overall the quality or confidence of the data set for the material sample or item) that may be useful for uniquely identifying and differentiated nuclear materials and potential inclusion in an NNFL [5] . what was done to the material at a given facility and when it was done. 8. Data vetting information-the preliminary checklist for vetting the data is included for completeness. 9. Metadata-data applicable to the entire set of information on a particular material sample or item including the overall quality and confidence in a data set.
This study was further utilized by the IAEA in developing the ''Development of a National Nuclear Forensics Library Draft Implementing Guide'' [6] . The Guide identifies several material characteristics and other information that should be considered for inclusion in the structure of NNFLs. While the data tables included in the Data Dictionary and the IAEA Guide provide a basis for consideration of what information to include, they suggest fields that would be included in an ideal situation. States must determine what fields are relevant for inclusion in their respective NNFL based on cost and benefit.
The Data Dictionary and IAEA Guide include information that can be broken down into three categories: administrative information, non-chemical and non-isotopic physical characteristics, and chemical and isotopic information.
Administrative information resides in process records at different types of facilities. This information is housed in the state system of accountancy and control (SSAC) for IAEA safeguards reporting requirements, as well as nuclear enterprise records in order to comply with domestic regulations. This includes (but is not limited to): -location of shipper and receiver of the material; -processing history, and associated dates; -accountancy, and associated dates; -location and use history, and associated dates; and, -storage history and associated dates.
Non-chemical and non-isotopic physical characteristics are included in shipment information and available in supply-chain management records. Prior to conducting nuclear forensic analysis on an interdicted sample, these types of data can help investigators begin to determine whether the interdicted material is of domestic origin. This information is housed in the records of the SSAC for IAEA safeguards reporting requirements, as well as nuclear enterprise records in order to comply with domestic regulations. This includes (but is not limited to):
-description of the material; -serial numbers; -encapsulation or cladding; -dimensions; -mass; and, -other process information that is critical for inclusion in an NNFL.
The IAEA has recommended a variety of different chemical and isotopic analytical techniques that can be used to analyze nuclear and radiological materials for inclusion in an NNFL. Examples of nuclear materials that could be included in each nuclear fuel cycle stage and the associated technique used to analyze them are laid out in Table 3 .
While an NNFL could include different chemical and isotopic signatures inherent to nuclear or radiological material arising from geologic or manufacturing processes, four provide a higher degree of discrimination:
-uranium or plutonium assay; -major element composition; -minor trace element composition; and, -uranium and/or plutonium isotopic composition
The information for this category is the most critical for nuclear forensics purposes as it provides investigators with the greatest amount of information in regards to the origin of the nuclear or radiological material in question. This information is housed in the records of the SSAC for IAEA safeguards reporting requirements, as well as nuclear enterprise records in order to comply with domestic regulations, but the question of how precise this information is important. In accordance with ASTM nuclear standards, as well as national regulatory and safeguards reporting requirements, the nuclear enterprise routinely collects information and report information on nuclear fuel cycle operations. While this information is extremely valuable for protecting inventories of sensitive materials, it may not be of high enough fidelity to help identify whether or not a material found outside of regulatory control is consistent with those inventories. However, information collected for non-nuclear forensics purposes serves as a starting point for determining the characteristics of those materials necessary to identify consistency with domestic inventories, and could potentially provide unique data that would allow investigators to draw important conclusions.
A Group 1 state may arrange to have these samples analyzed so that high-fidelity information is recorded but has to consider a broad range of proprietary, legal, and political questions. While independent verification of any existing information is preferred, if the state has the capability to do so, Group 1 states are not producers of the materials they are utilizing. A state may request, This process would occur purely on a case-to-case basis. Widespread reluctance amongst states to share data on their nuclear materials for both national security and economic reasons make it make it possible that a state will not be allowed to reanalyze nuclear or radiological material it has received. As mentioned before, much of the data needed for a NNFL already exists within the State. As this information has been collected for non-nuclear forensics purposes by a variety of different actors, the challenge is mostly tracking it down, vetting the data, and checking it for consistency.
Results and discussion
When embarking on the establishment of an NNFL, a Group 1 state must map out the entirety of its domestic nuclear fuel cycle, facilities that store or ship/receive nuclear or radioactive materials, associated facilities that have the instrumentation to conduct materials analysis, and identify subject-matter domain experts. In most states this cannot be treated as a 'once through' process, rather the development of a NNFL is on-going process of surveying, collecting, and organizing information on the state's nuclear and radiological profile. In developing an NNFL, it is most important for a Group 1 state to implement an NNFL structure that could be most readily utilized in the event of an interdiction, rather than a complex structure with many missing fields. Throughout this process, it is of critical importance that the state has political buy-in from all relevant actors. Political buy-in will help the agency charged with standing up the NNFL with any bureaucratic hurdles in may encounter throughout the process.
A Group 1 states' NNFL would focus primarily on receipt and storage of fresh fuel at reactors, irradiation, and nuclear waste handling and storage. Group 1 states do not have complex nuclear fuel cycles but potentially possess a large amount of material in the form of fresh and irradiated nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, and radiological sources. A Group 1 state's nuclear fuel cycle activities are conducted in agreement with other countries, i.e., Group 1 states receive equipment and materials from supplier state under a commercial arrangement. Although Group 1 states may source much of the information they need from suppliers, suppliers may be unwilling to share complete analyses of materials due to commercial and security sensitivities. In the event that suppliers are unwilling to share complete analyses with the state, the state should gather any information that is available to it through various records and populate this information in its NNFL. Although gaps in information can be detrimental in the event of a nuclear security investigation, any information that does exist can inform prosecutions, and allow the state to draw conclusions on the providence of the nuclear or radiological material(s) in question.
As a first step, it is important for Group 1 states to document any administrative, non-chemical and non-isotopic physical, and chemical and isotopic information that promotes continuity of knowledge on that sample. All nuclear materials residing in a Group 1 state should be included in an NNFL. The list includes, but is not limited to medical and industrial radioactive sources, natural or enriched uranium fuel used in nuclear power or research reactors, irradiated nuclear fuel, and nuclear waste. As outlined above, NNFLs consist of one or a series of databases containing information on material characteristics and material history. Administrative information and nonchemical and non-isotopic physical characteristics provides information how the material was produced and other relevant information, including the intended use of the material, while chemical and isotopic information provide a basis of determining the process used for the production of the material.
Once a Group 1 states gathers administrative information, and non-chemical and non-isotopic physical characteristics, the state would begin focusing on chemical characteristics, including uranium assay (percent uranium in the material), major and minor/trace element composition, and isotope composition for all samples. Any available information on chemical and isotopic characteristics provide a basis of determining the process used for the production of the material, and as such will inform investigators as to whether any of the processes in question exist within the state. As mentioned earlier, while a Group 1 state may have the instrumentation to gather many of these characteristics, especially for those with nuclear power plants and/or research reactors, not all Group 1 states will have the instrumentation and expertise required. However, even if a Group 1 state possesses this capability, it is not clear whether its supplying partner will allow it to conduct further analysis of the materials. The effort to navigate the legal process required to receive permission to conduct detailed analyses of multiple samples can potentially outweigh perceived benefit and, as such, could create more of a burden than the state would deem appropriate. The process required may negate political will for the establishment of an NNFL, and as such this process must be navigated carefully.
In Group 1 states with less political will, and lower financial and technical resources, it may be more practical for the state to rely on information supplied by the nuclear power plant operators and research reactor operators and any associated technical institutes, the national regulator, and point-of-contact for the SSAC responsible for IAEA reporting, and use the information received to populate its NNFL. This would allow the state to focus financial and technical resources on database design and NNFL development. However, this assumes that the quality of the data that the State is receives is of sufficient fidelity to serve a nuclear forensics purpose. If the information received from these actors, once vetted, is found to be of low fidelity and thus not as useful as wanted for a nuclear forensics purpose, its value in the context of a nuclear forensics investigation drops. If information of sufficient fidelity is not available, the Group 1 state in question would have to make the decision whether to conduct their own analysis, if applicable, thus raising the cost of development of the NNFL, or simply use the information that was provided and as they allocate more funding to construction and maintenance of an NNFL capability and develop a strong technical base, conduct additional analyses. This may be an appropriate course for a Group 1 state to take, as financial and technical resources can be devoted to database design and NNFL development, but it does not come without serious drawbacks from a nuclear security investigation standpoint.
Conclusion
Utilizing this assessment, Group 1 states should have a better understanding of the potential effort standing up an NNFL may take. Group 1 states make up over 75 % of the IAEA Member States, and hence it was decided to use these states as a basis for further examination. Although these states are at a disadvantage in technical capability and subject-matter domain expertise, they have the advantage of potentially having the most straight-forward NNFL structure. States with more sophisticated nuclear fuel cycles have a much larger pool of information to identify and organize, and thus are faced with a more daunting task in setting up an NNFL. NNFL's in these states will undoubtedly have a more complicated data structure. States falling into Group 1, and especially Group 1B, will have a much more reproducible and sharable data structure. Once guidance on data structure and best practices are established for Group 1 state, they can be reused with minor changes from dozens of other states. The IAEA and ITWG can help facilitate this process by providing a series of steps and template to other Group 1 states. The sharing of data templates for tracking radiological sources is already taking place with dozens of countries. With an institutionalized approach, the international community can effectively cover 75 % of all IAEA Member States and make great strides in the furthering of a global nuclear forensics architecture.
